"Flash-in-the-pan" development in Egypt? IMF-backed economic recovery stymied by absence of structural reforms and massive human rights violations by Roll, Stephan
www.ssoar.info
"Flash-in-the-pan" development in Egypt? IMF-
backed economic recovery stymied by absence
of structural reforms and massive human rights
violations
Roll, Stephan
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Roll, S. (2018). "Flash-in-the-pan" development in Egypt? IMF-backed economic recovery stymied by absence of
structural reforms and massive human rights violations. (SWP Comment, 31/2018). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-58637-6
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
  
 
NO. 31 JULY 2018 Introduction 
“Flash-in-the-Pan” Development 
in Egypt? 
IMF-backed Economic Recovery Stymied by Absence of Structural Reforms and 
Massive Human Rights Violations 
Stephan Roll 
In November 2016, Egypt agreed a comprehensive aid programme with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). Its stated objective was to stabilize the country’s macro-
economic situation within three years and put it on track for inclusive economic 
growth. At the half-way stage, hardly any structural reforms have been implemented 
despite a short-term macroeconomic stabilization resulting from the conditions put 
in place. Rather, the increasingly influential military has prevented the emergence of 
a functioning market economy. This has been compounded by the disastrous human 
rights record of the government under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, which has also 
had a negative impact on Egypt’s economic development. Germany played a key role 
in the IMF agreement being concluded. The German government should, therefore, 
work to ensure the IMF produces a critical assessment of the reforms that have taken 
place so far. It should also link its willingness to support future aid packages with 
improving the human rights situation and strengthening civil society. 
 
In July 2016, Egypt was forced to send a 
request for assistance to the IMF. In the 
months that followed, they negotiated a 
three-year reform programme. The individ-
ual measures announced in the programme 
show how dramatic the situation was for 
the Egyptian government in the summer of 
2016. In the past, the Egyptians had round-
ly rejected calls by international donors for 
comprehensive subsidy reductions, tax 
increases and a freeing up of the exchange 
rate. This time, the country’s insolvency 
was so palpable that the political leadership 
under President Sisi had no alternative but 
to agree to the corresponding commit-
ments. The country’s borrowing require-
ment to implement the programme was 
estimated at 35 billion US dollars. The IMF 
agreed to provide 12 billion US dollars in 
loans under extended fund facilities. In 
order to obtain this money, Egypt needed 
to raise the remaining amount through 
negotiations with other financial institu-
tions and major donor countries, notably 
Germany. The phased disbursement of the 
IMF loan in a total of six tranches was 
linked to positive half-yearly evaluations 
by the Fund. 
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Conditionalities take effect 
In its interim reports to date, the IMF has 
painted a very positive picture of how the 
announced reforms are being implemented. 
In fact, Cairo has essentially already imple-
mented the agreed monetary and fiscal 
policies which have helped achieve some 
economic stabilization in Egypt. For exam-
ple, the depreciation of the Egyptian pound 
as part of exchange rate liberalization in 
November 2016 contributed significantly to 
a decline in the current account deficit to 
0.8% of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2017 
(from 1.8% of GDP over the same period in 
the previous year) and to increased foreign 
exchange availability. In addition, the 
central bank’s foreign exchange reserves 
increased significantly (from 17.55 billion 
US dollars in July 2016 to 44.26 billion US 
dollars in June 2018). The budget deficit 
was reduced further by cutting energy 
subsidies by much more than 40 percent 
in some cases and introducing sales tax at 
a rate of 14 percent. For the first time in 
years, the budget deficit could amount to 
less than ten percent of GDP in the current 
financial year (2015/16: 12.5 percent of 
GDP). This would even allow the budget 
to show a small primary surplus (budget 
surplus, excluding debt service costs). 
As a consequence of macroeconomic 
stabilization, Egypt can now refinance itself 
on the international capital market again. 
Above all, however, it has paved the way 
for more exports, a revival of tourism and 
stronger – albeit mostly state – invest-
ment activity. As a result, economic growth 
will increase by more than one percentage 
point to an expected 5.2% (budget year 
2017/2018). 
But there is also a downside to the cur-
rent reform policy. Egypt’s debt burden has 
continued to increase since the programme 
began and is expected to reach well over 
100 percent of GDP by the end of 2017. 
According to figures from the Egyptian cen-
tral bank, more than 40 percent of govern-
ment revenue had to be spent on servicing 
debt in the first half of 2017/18, which 
severely narrows the scope for investment, 
for example. 
Above all, however, the life situation 
of most Egyptians has deteriorated dramati-
cally in the course of the reforms. The cut 
in subsidies and price increases following 
exchange rate liberalization led to a drastic 
increase in inflation to over 30 percent at 
times. Due to the higher prices, well over 
35 percent of the population is now be-
lieved to live below the national poverty 
line (45 US dollars per month). There can, 
therefore, be no talk of inclusive growth so 
far. In response to this worrying develop-
ment, the Egyptian government refers to 
the reduction in unemployment from 12.5 
percent (2016) to 10.6 percent (first quarter 
of 2018). However, it seems questionable 
whether these figures are meaningful. It is 
striking that, according to official govern-
ment figures, the proportion of working 
population to total population is less than 
one third – an extremely low value by 
international standards, which suggests a 
significantly higher level of unemployment. 
Insufficient structural reform 
The worsening living conditions caused 
by the reforms are all the more serious 
because it is by no means clear that this is 
only a short period of economic hardship 
and that, in the long term, the population 
will benefit from the course being taken. 
For the current economic recovery to be 
more than a flash in the pan, comprehen-
sive structural reforms are needed. These 
are referred to in the programme itself as 
“crucial” for success. However, the cata-
logue of structural reforms agreed with the 
IMF appears rather arbitrary. By themselves, 
measures such as streamlining industrial 
licensing procedures, drafting new bank-
ruptcy legislation or improving public 
transport safety may be important issues. 
But, as long as the institutional and regu-
latory framework of the Egyptian economy 
is not fundamentally reformed, they are 
unlikely to have any effect. Deficiencies 
such as the complete lack of transparency 
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with which the government plans and 
implements contentious infrastructure 
projects, for example establishing a new 
capital city or constructing the country’s 
first nuclear power plant are not mentioned 
in the IMF agreement, nor are endemic 
corruption and dysfunctional market sur-
veillance institutions. The expansion of the 
military within the economy was also not 
mentioned. This phenomenon, in particu-
lar, has clearly become more relevant since 
2013 and is counteracting the development 
of a functioning market economy. The mili-
tary is involved in numerous civil sectors 
such as construction, food production and 
energy. It benefits not only from preferen-
tial treatment in public procurement, but 
also from tax privileges and cheap labour. 
This puts private entrepreneurship at a 
clear disadvantage, which can also be seen 
in statistical surveys, such as the purchas-
ing manager index of banking group Emi-
rates NBD. According to the index, economic 
activity in the private sector (with the ex-
ception of the energy sector) has tended to 
decline since the beginning of the reforms. 
Police state as a barrier to growth 
It is important not to ignore the excessive 
police state repression under President Sisi 
when evaluating the current economic 
reforms in Egypt because this, too, will 
counteract any sustainable economic devel-
opment. Egypt can only develop its full 
potential as a tourist destination or invest-
ment location if it achieves lasting political 
stability. Notably, the current upturn in 
tourism has only been possible due to 
falling prices caused by the tense security 
situation. Foreign direct investment actu-
ally declined in the last quarter of 2017, 
with no improvement on the horizon. The 
routine use of massive police violence 
against sections of the population promotes 
social polarization. The security forces 
repeatedly carry out enforced disappear-
ances. Human Rights Watch reports docu-
ment the systematic use of torture. It is 
estimated that more than 60,000 political 
prisoners are living in overcrowded deten-
tion centres considered breeding grounds 
for Islamist radicalization. 
State repression is by no means only 
directed against political opponents, but 
also against the entire non-governmental 
civil society. There are hardly any human 
rights activists who have not been either 
arrested or at least charged. In addition, 
there are comprehensive restrictions on 
press freedom. Journalists cannot report 
freely, critical television channels and 
online media are blocked. In 2017, Egypt 
ranked 161 out of 180 in the World Press 
Freedom Index produced by Reporters 
Without Borders. As a result, the regime 
is suppressing those very actors who 
advocate the fight against corruption, state 
transparency and the establishment of 
procedures based on the rule of law. 
Implications for Germany’s policy 
on Egypt 
Germany played a major role in the IMF 
agreement being concluded with Egypt. It 
was not so much the weight of the German 
vote on the IMF Board of Directors that was 
so significant, it was more that Egypt was 
relying on Germany’s help to organize the 
additional funding needed for the IMF loan. 
Previously, Germany was Egypt’s largest 
single creditor by far within the Paris Club 
with loans of 4.6 billion US dollars in 2016. 
In 2017, total loans and government guar-
antees came to the princely sum of 6.5 
billion US dollars. Germany was, therefore, 
the second largest creditor nation behind 
Saudi Arabia (around 8 billion US dollars in 
central bank deposits). Nonetheless, Ger-
many offered further loans (250 million 
US dollars in 2016 and the same amount in 
2017) – a very important signal for other 
donors, including European countries such 
as France and the UK. Against the backdrop 
of the refugee crisis, however, the German 
government considered support for the 
reform programme primarily as an oppor-
tunity to encourage Egypt to close its Medi-
terranean Sea border to irregular migration, 
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while negotiating the programme and 
reviewing it were left entirely to the IMF. 
The results of the programme so far 
show that this approach was not very effec-
tive in promoting sustainable economic 
development. However, such economic 
development is essential from a German 
and European point of view. If the most 
densely populated Mediterranean country 
with a population of around 100 million 
were to collapse, it would have unforesee-
able consequences for Europe from growing 
migratory pressure and a rising terrorist 
threat. Therefore, two conclusions for 
German politics from this precarious situa-
tion should be drawn: Firstly, the German 
government should make its own assess-
ment of the economic reforms and strongly 
urge the IMF to explicitly identify obvious 
problems, such as the expansion of the 
military within the economy. For the IMF to 
not even mention key obstacles to reform 
in its reports is evidence of a dangerous 
misperception of developments in Egypt. 
This paints a distorted picture of the coun-
try, as occurred all too often in analyses 
by international financial institutions 
before 2011 – including the IMF. Identify-
ing reform deficits is all the more urgent 
as the two outstanding loan tranches could 
be used as leverage to demand tangible 
progress from the Egyptian government, 
at least in some areas. 
Secondly, Germany should, together 
with its European partners where possible, 
address the question of how to respond 
to future requests for support from the 
Egyptian government. Given the Egyptian 
government’s dramatic debt burden and 
failure to set a course for greater, sustain-
able economic growth, it is unlikely that 
the country will be able to manage without 
further external assistance once the current 
IMF-backed reform programme has ended. 
However, renewed support after 2019 only 
makes sense if it also benefits the popula-
tion. This requires conditionalities that 
not only have a greater impact on effecting 
structural reform than has been the case 
to date, but also on improving the human 
rights situation and strengthening civil 
society. Urging international donor institu-
tions to include appropriate conditions in 
their programmes does not appear to be 
working. The IMF, in particular, does not 
consider the enforcement of human rights 
a part of its mandate. However, Germany, 
as the most important creditor among Paris 
Club nations, will have significant influ-
ence on such programmes being agreed. 
The German government can, therefore, 
link its approval with ancillary agreements. 
It should use this leverage to promote the 
development of a political framework that 
will enable economic development for the 
benefit of the Egyptian people. 
 
Dr. Stephan Roll is Deputy Head of the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. 
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